\u3ci\u3eMasson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.\u3c/i\u3e, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991): Journalists Score Hollow Victory in Close Encounter of the Word Kind—and You Can [Mis]quote Me on That by Thomas, Steven M.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 71 | Issue 3 Article 7
1992
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419
(1991): Journalists Score Hollow Victory in Close
Encounter of the Word Kind—and You Can
[Mis]quote Me on That
Steven M. Thomas
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Steven M. Thomas, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991): Journalists Score Hollow Victory in Close Encounter of
the Word Kind—and You Can [Mis]quote Me on That, 71 Neb. L. Rev. (1992)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol71/iss3/7
Note
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419
(1991): Journalists Score Hollow Victory in Close
Encounter of the Word Kind-and You Can
[Mis]quote Me on That
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................... 901
II. Background ................................................ 902
III. Statement of the Case ..................................... 905
IV. Analysis ................................................... 906
A. The Ninth Circuit Opinion ............... ........ 906
B. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion ................ 912
C. The Supreme Court Dissenting Opinion .............. 916
V. Conclusion ................................................. 918
I. INTRODUCTION
The direct quotation is a narrative device treasured much by writ-
ers and readers alike. But the quoted passages that appear in print are
not always carbon copies of the words actually spoken. Writers and
reporters-for a number of reasons, some better than others-have
been known to misquote those who feed them their steady diet of
news. When writers attribute to newsmakers damning words they did
not utter, the cry of libel can sound. During the 1991 term, the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of errant quotations in Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc.I
The plaintiff in Masson did not contend that The New Yorker had
negligently misquoted him. Negligently misquoting a public figure is a
pardonable offense under the "actual malice" standard articulated in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.2 The allegedly libeled plaintiff in
Masson maintained that the woman who penned his profile deliber-
ately misquoted him in a number of defamatory passages. The Court
held that deliberately misquoting a public figure is not actionable un-
less the alterations materially change the meaning of the actual
1. 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
2. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535,
1558 (9th Cir. 1989)(Kozinski, J., dissenting); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.
v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989).
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This Note divides Masson into the three opinions it spawned-that
of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court majority and the Supreme
Court dissent. The three opinions differ sharply on the issue of how
far wayward a writer may wander when surrounding with quotation
marks the words of another. The Ninth Circuit extended broad im-
munity to writers, mandating very little in the way of accuracy. The
Court's majority offered significant protection, demanding only that
quotes not be terribly errant. The dissent would have offered no pro-
tection, requiring writers to either paraphrase or reproduce with
painstaking precision their sources' spoken words. The merits, mi-
nuses and prospective effects of the three opinions are the focus of this
Note.
II. BACKGROUND
The courts that would decide Masson had watching over them the
precedential power broker that is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.4
The libel landmark prevents a public official from recovering damages
for publication of a defamatory falsehood unless she proves by clear
and convincing evidence 5 that it was published with "actual malice."
6
A plaintiff can demonstrate actual malice by proving that the defama-
tory statement was published with "knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."7 Three years
later, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 8 the Court extended to public
figures9 application of the "actual malice" standard.10 Unlike the
3. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (1991).
4. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
5. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964).
7. Id at 279-80.
8. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
9. The Court defined a public figure as a person who thrusts her personality into the
"vortex" of an important public controversy. Id at 155. In Gertz, the Court said a
person becomes a public figure by reason of the notoriety of his achievements or
the vigor and success with which he seeks the public's attention. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974). Gertz also distinguished between all-purpose
and "limited" public figures. I& at 351.
10. Libel law is more protective of private citizens than of public figures. Private
individuals are believed to be more vulnerable to injury and more deserving of
recovery. Unlike private citizens, public figures are said to have easy access to
media channels. If and when their good names are bespattered, public figures
often are afforded the opportunity to counteract the false statements. Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974). By not accepting public office or as-
suming an influential role in ordering society, a private citizen has relinquished
no part of her interest in protecting her good name. Consequently, she has a more
compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted from a libelous state-
ment. Id. at 345. "Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury
than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery."
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"knowledge of falsity" element of the actual malice standard, the
"reckless disregard" component is not easily defined." A defendant
invites a finding of reckless disregard when he publishes with a "high
degree of awareness of... probable falsity"12 or "entertain[s] serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication."1
3
When time came for the Ninth Circuit to render a decision in Mas-
son, the cupboards were not well stocked with case law on matters of
misquotation.14 What scant case law there was had been put on the
shelves by sister circuits. In Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers,
Inc.,15 the mayor of a city in New Jersey indicated that excessive litter
was largely the result of incoming foreigners whose previous exposure
to abject poverty had caused them to lack respect for others' prop-
erty.' 6 Editors at a Spanish newspaper wrote a headline based on the
mayor's comments. The headline, translated into English, read: "Eliz-
abeth Mayor on the Attack: Calls Hispanics 'Pigs.' "-17 The mayor sued
for libel and lost. The Third Circuit reasoned that the headline was a
"rational interpretation" of the mayor's remarks.' 8 Moreover, "pigs"
was said to be a fair translation for "litterbug," a word for which there
was no Spanish equivalent.' 9
The Second Circuit addressed misquoted matter in Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche.2O A.E. Hotchner, a successful writer and lecturer, was
a friend and traveling companion of Nobel Prize-winning author Er-
nest Hemingway. Hemingway allegedly described Hotchner, a public
Id. The Gertz Court held that states, so long as they do not impose strict liability,
may define for themselves the standard under which a private citizen may re-
cover for publication of a defamatory falsehood. Id. at 347.
11. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968).
12. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
13. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
14. In public figure libel litigation, a statement-in order to be actionable-must be
more than false and published with actual malice. The statement also must be
defamatory. Fabricated quotations may be defamatory in two senses. The Masson
Court stated:
First, the quotation might injure because it attributes an untrue factual
assertion to the speaker. An example would be a fabricated quotation of
a public official admitting he had been convicted of a serious crime when
in fact he had not. Second, regardless of the truth or falsity of the fac-
tual matters asserted within the quoted statement, the attribution may
result in injury to reputation because the manner of expression or even
the fact that the statement was made indicates a negative personal trait
or an attitude the speaker does not hold.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (1991).
15. 833 F.2d 446 (3rd Cir. 1987).
16. I& at 448.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 452.
19. Id
20. 551 F.2d 910 (2nd Cir. 1977).
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figure, in a way that was clearly unflattering and arguably profane.21
Spanish writer Jose Luis Castillo-Puche used Hemingway's words ver-
batim in his 1967 book. But editors at Doubleday & Company, Inc.-
the company that published the English translation of Castillo-
Puche's work-used an emasculated version of Hemingway's quota-
tion.22 Hotchner brought suit, contending that Doubleday should be
liable for knowingly publishing a bowdlerized version of Hemingway's
alleged statement. 23 The libel suit ended in a judgment for the de-
fendant. The Second Circuit said the watered-down words had not in-
creased the defamatory impact of Hemingway's statement or
substantively altered its content.2 4
Far more egregious was the reportorial impropriety in Carson v.
Allied News Co.25 National Insider, a tabloid periodical, published an
article asserting that Johnny Carson's motivation for moving the To-
night Show to Hollywood was the entertainer's desire to be closer to
Joanna Holland.26 The tabloid labeled Ms. Holland as the woman who
"broke up" Carson's former marriage. 27 The reporter in Carson did
not merely alter sources' spoken words. Rather, the reporter conjured
them up in a reckless fit of creativity. The district court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit re-
versed, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a jury trial on the
issue of actual malice.28
Thus, when time came for the courts to decide Masson, there was
on the table a collage of case law and a handful of propositions. Car-
son found actual malice present when the words flanked by quotation
marks were conjured up by the writer.2 9 Hotchner refused to con-
demn those who had tampered only slightly with others' words. Dunn
21. Hemingway allegedly said that Hotchner was "dirty and a terrible ass-licker.
There's something phony about him. I wouldn't sleep in the same room with
him." Id. at 914.
22. The English version of Castillo-Puche's work quoted Hemingway as having said
of Hotchner: "I don't really trust him, though." Id at 912.
23. 1& at 914.
24. Id,
25. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
26. Id. at 208.
27. Id.
28. In reversing, Circuit Judge Sprecher wrote:
[I]n the catalogue of responsibilities of journalists .. .must be a canon
that a journalist does not invent quotations and attribute them to actual
persons. If a writer can sit down in the quiet of his cubicle and create
conversations as a 'logical extension of what must have gone on' and dis-
pense this as news, it is difficult to perceive what First Amendment pro-
tection such fiction can claim.
Id. at 213.
29. See also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968)(asserting that profes-
sions of good faith will likely be unpersuasive when the story is a "product of [the
defendant's] imagination."
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stood for the proposition that writers need not reproduce the speaker's
precise utterance, provided the words opted for are a rational interpre-
tation of those actually spoken.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Psychoanalyst Jeffrey M. Masson was hired in 1980 as the projects
director of the Sigmund Freud Archives. Located at Maresfield Gar-
dens outside of London, the Archives serve as a repository rich in
Freudian materials. Masson accepted the post at the invitation of
Archives leader Dr. Kurt Eissler and Freud's daughter, Dr. Anna
Freud. But Masson was unwilling to work at the behest of those who
had hired him. He grew disenchanted with Freudian psychology and
was terminated soon after his anti-Freudian feelings surfaced during a
1981 lecture before the Western New England Psychoanalytical
Society.30
Masson later agreed to sit down with Janet Malcolm for a series of
interviews. Malcolm was a contributing writer for The New Yorker, a
weekly magazine of much literary repute. Malcolm's exhaustive in-
terviews with Masson resulted in a 48,500-word profile, published by
The New Yorker in 1983 as a two-part series. In the article, quotation
marks flanked lengthy passages attributed to Masson.3 1 Masson took
umbrage to several of the quoted passages, alleging that they were
fraught with defamatory inaccuracies. The article was reprinted one
year later, this time as a 165-page book published by Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc.3 2 The reviews were largely commendatory.3 3 But Masson, cast as
a belligerent and unbearable egomaniac with a penchant for promiscu-
ity,34 was less willing to shower Malcolm with authorial accolades. He
filed a $10 million libel suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California35 and named as defendants The New
Yorker, Malcolm and Knopf. Masson alleged that Malcolm had sur-
rounded with quotation marks words and passages he had not ut-
30. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991).
31. 1&
32. Id- at 2425.
33. Id.
34. In Masson, the Court resurrected a review published in the Boston Globe. The
reviewer said Masson emerged as a "grandiose egoist-mean-spirited, self-serv-
ing, full of braggadocio, impossibly arrogant and, in the end, a self-destructive
fool. But it is not Janet Malcolm who calls him such: his own words reveal this
psychological profile .... " Id- at 2425.
35. The suit was brought under California libel law. In California, "libel is a false and
unprivileged publication... which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridi-
cule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a
tendency to injure him in his occupation." CAL. CiV. CODE ANN. sec. 45 (West
1982). However, the Court noted that the First Amendment limits California's
libel law in several respects. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2419, 2429 (1991).
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tered.3 6 He bolstered his contention with the interview tapes, none of
which contained the quoted passages with which he took issue.37
The parties agreed at the outset that Masson was deserving of the
"public figure" label. When the allegedly libeled plaintiff is a public
figure, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the
finder of fact can conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the
defamatory statement was published with actual malice.38 In Masson,
the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted. The dis-
trict court found that the allegedly fabricated quotations either were
substantially true or were rational interpretations of what Masson
said on tape.39 On appeal, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, with one judge dissenting.40 The appellate court's rationale
essentially mirrored that of the lower court. The Supreme Court re-
versed on a 7-2 decision penned by Justice Kennedy. The Court held
that deliberately altered quotations attributed to a public figure may
be libelous only if the alterations materially change the meaning of
what was actually said.41 Justice White, joined by Justice Scalia,
wrote an opinion in which he concurred in part and dissented in part.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court wisely refused to immunize from libel litigation irre-
sponsible, too-quick-to-quote writers who deliberately and materially
alter the words of another. Nonetheless, the holding still allows writ-
ers and journalists to tinker too much with their sources' spoken
words. Thus, a Court bent on protecting the press insults it as well,
further inviting readers and newsmakers to question the credibility
that has so long served as the trump card of the print media.
A. The Ninth Circuit Opinion
The Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's order grant-
ing summary judgment to the defendants. After wading through each
of the quoted passages to which Masson took exception, the court con-
cluded that the alleged inaccuracies did not raise a jury question of
36. The Court noted that California courts previously had held that false attribution
of statements to a person may be libelous if the falsity exposes the person to an
injury comprehended by the statute. See Selleck v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 212 Cal.
Rptr. 838, 844 (1985); Cameron v. Wernick, 60 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1967).
37. Malcolm maintained that not all of her conversations with Masson had been re-
corded on tape. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2428
(1991). But on motions for summary judgment, all justifiable inferences are
drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Because of that, the Court and the Ninth
Circuit assumed that the quotations had been deliberately altered.
38. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986).
39. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
40. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989).
41. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (1991).
[Vol. 71:901
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actual malice. The panel used a handful of reasons-some more objec-
tionable than others-to pardon each passage. In some instances, Mal-
colm's alleged alterations were deemed not actionable because there
was no "substantive difference" between what was published and
what was said.42 In other instances, the panel found the published
passages to be "rational interpretations" of the actual statements.43
Finally, the panel took note of the bombastic backdrop constructed by
Masson and relied upon the "incremental harm" doctrine to excuse
the challenged statements.44
The first misquotation assessed by the Ninth Circuit was deemed
harmless because the words actually spoken and the published quota-
tion were substantively the same. Masson's grandfather had changed
the family name from Moussaieff to Masson. The article quoted Mas-
son as saying that he substituted Moussaieff for Lloyd as his middle
name because "it sounded better."45 Nowhere on the tapes can be
found the phrase "it sounded better." But in one tape-recorded state-
ment, Masson said he changed his middle name to his family's one-
time surname because he "just liked it."46
Even the finicky would have trouble quarreling with the appellate
court's finding that the two passages were materially the same. The
Supreme Court, in its sole exhibition of acquiescence, chose not to dis-
turb the lower court's finding on the "it sounded better" quotation.47
The Ninth Circuit's inaugural assessment was also its best. The
panel bid adieu to a "substantive difference" test that the Court later
found palatable. From there, the Ninth Circuit's analysis slithered
downhill. The next quotation reviewed involved Masson's characteri-
zation of his relationship with Eissler and Anna Freud. Malcolm
quoted Masson as saying that, to those who had hired him, he was not
unlike an "intellectual gigolo." 48 On tape, Masson uttered no such
thing. Rather, the psychoanalyst stated that Eissler and Anna Freud
viewed him as a "private asset but a public liability."49 Masson also
said that Eissler and Anna Freud thought he was "much too junior
within the hierarchy of analysis, for these important training analysts
to be caught dead with [him]."50 The appellate court agreed with the
district court's finding that use of the term "intellectual gigolo" 51 was
42. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989).
43. Id at 1541-42, 1546.
44. 1& at 1541.
45. Id at 1540.
46. I&
47. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).
48. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989).
49. I&
50. I&
51. Whether the term "intellectual gigolo" is defamatory is a question of California
law. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 11 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991)(stating
1992]
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not something from which malice could be inferred.52 The term was
considered to be a rational interpretation of Masson's tape-recorded
comments.
53
The jurisprudential ancestry of the rational interpretation doctrine
dates back to Time v. Pape. 4 That suit stemmed from a report issued
by the United States Commission on Civil Rights. The report con-
tained a description of an incident of alleged police brutality in Chi-
cago.55 The report included a critical disclaimer, explicitly stating that
the incident described was based on allegations in a complaint.56
Time, a weekly news magazine, quoted heavily from the complaint
without indicating that the charges were those leveled by the victim
rather than the Commission.5 7 The Court found for Time, reasoning
that omission of the word "alleged" was a "rational interpretation[ ] of
a document that bristled with ambiguities."58 That the rational inter-
pretation test has its place is not doubted. The query deserving of an
answer is whether the Ninth Circuit had any business applying that
doctrine in this case. The Supreme Court did well to answer in the
negative.
In reversing, the Court correctly stated that quotation marks with-
out qualification alert readers that they are reading the speaker's
words-not the writer's interpretation of the same.5 9 Newspapers and
magazines do not come equipped with margin notes that say "you are
now reading precisely what the speaker said." Quotation marks ac-
complish as much. But as the Court noted, a rational interpretation
standard would strip the reader of her only method of sorting actual
that, to the extent the Ninth Circuit based its conclusion in the First Amend-
ment, it was mistaken).
52. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989).
53. In assessing the "intellectual gigolo" quotation, the district court clearly used the
rational interpretation test. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp.
1396, 1400-01 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The Ninth Circuit appears to endorse the same
test, though there is a certain amount of ambiguity. Masson v. New Yorker Mag-
azine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989). Even if the Ninth Circuit did not
use the rational interpretation test to analyze the "intellectual gigolo" quotation,
it undeniably used the same test in reviewing at least two other quotations. Id- at
1541-42, 1546.
54. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
55. I& at 280-81.
56. Id at 280.
57. Id. at 282.
58. I& at 290. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485
(1984). In Bose, Consumer Reports published an article reviewing a loudspeaker
system placed on the market by the plaintiff. The article stated that instruments
heard through the Bose system tended to "wander about the room." Id at 488.
The Court excused the writer's choice of words under the rational interpretation
test. Id at 512-13.
59. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (1991).
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utterances from authorial interpretations.60 The prospective harm in
removing such a sorting device was recognized by the Court. The
term "direct quotation" would have become a misnomer. Such a stan-
dard would have eviscerated the trust that readers have long placed in
words flanked by quotation marks. And a newsmaker, cognizant of a
reporter's license to tinker with his words, might have stood mute
rather than run the risk of being misquoted in the morning paper.
The rational: interpretation doctrine, though somewhat elastic, is
not infinitely malleable. To be certain, writers and reporters spend a
good share of their days and nights interpreting. Consider the re-
porter sent to cover the president's State of the Union Address. The
article that adorns the newspaper's front page the following morning
will be sprinkled with whatever sprightly and contentious quips the
nation's top executive had to offer. But everything not enclosed in
quotation marks-the majority of the article, no doubt-is the writer's
interpretation of what the president said. The reporter who skims a
police report and files a story is interpreting. So too is the reporter
who writes an article after sifting through a newly introduced, 30-page
legislative bill. To do anything other than serve the readership with
an official transcript is to interpret.
But writers and reporters receive a respite from the almost inces-
sant interpretation when they choose to use direct quotations. When
quoting, gone is the often arduous duty of culling clarity from the sea
of confusion. Reporters who quote directly are inserting no editorial
slant, importing no personal synthesis. As the Court's majority and
the Ninth Circuit dissenting opinion so accurately note, a direct quota-
tion is commonly understood to contain no interpretation.6 1 A writer
who uses a direct quote no more interprets than does a tape recorder.
By wrapping quotation marks around the speaker's words, the re-
porter is handing to the reader the baton of interpretation.
Malcolm's taped interviews with Masson spanned some forty
hours.6 2 Judging from the comments indisputably made by Masson,
the psychoanalyst is an eclectic thinker, perhaps bordering on being
bizarre. During the twosome's protracted question-and-answer ses-
sion, Masson indubitably made ambiguous remarks that clear heads
would not untangle easily. In paraphrasing Masson's words, Mal-
colm's job must have been difficult. But when Malcolm opted to
bracket Masson's words with quotation marks, her job took a sudden
turn toward the simple. Her need to interpret faded. And with it, so
too did the doctrine that allows one to interpref erroneously. If all
courts were to join hands with the Ninth Circuit and make available
60. I-
61. I&; Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1549 (9th Cir.
1989)(Kozinski, J., dissenting).
62. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (1991).
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the rational interpretation defense, quotation marks63 could accu-
rately be described as decorative accents. They would signify nothing,
save that the words within them are distant heirs of those actually
spoken.
Even had the Ninth Circuit not pulled from the shelf the rational
interpretation defense, it nonetheless would have found the "intellec-
tual gigolo" passage non-defamatory. The panel pointed to two courts
that have used the "incremental harm branch" of the "libel-proof"
doctrine to defeat plaintiffs' libel claims.64 The argument in support
of that defense runs as follows: Suppose a public figure's reputation
has been bespattered by printed statements that were not made with
actual malice and are thus not actionable. If other defamatory state-
ments in the same article were published with actual malice-but in-
flict wounds no deeper than those already inflicted-the statements
are not actionable. The non-actionable portion of the story becomes
the measuring stick.
Armed with the incremental harm doctrine, the Ninth Circuit
looked at Malcolm's article as a whole. The panel noted that Masson
was neither meek nor modest.65 The appellate court concluded that
the stream of provocative utterances and braggadocio made nominal, if
not non-existent, the additional harm done by the "intellectual gigolo"
quotation. The Ninth Circuit's dissenting opinion could find little
merit in the incremental harm doctrine. Judge Kozinski found the
doctrine particularly ill-suited for application in Masson. The dissent-
ing judge did not dispute the panel's assertion that less-than-modest
remarks littered the article. But Judge Kozinski reasoned that the
most "provocative, bombastic" statements attributed to Masson were
the very ones the psychoanalyst denied having made.66 Thus, the dis-
sent in the Ninth Circuit took issue with the doctrine because, in ap-
plying it, the panel assumed that the other disputed remarks were, in
fact, made. Reference to an eloquent and well-reasoned D.C. Circuit
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, further fueled the harangue against
the incremental harm doctrine.67
63. A quotation mark is "one of a pair of punctuation marks... used to indicate the
beginning and the end of a quotation in which the exact phraseology of another or
of a text is directly cited." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1971)(emphasis added).
64. Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 516 F. Supp. 742, 750 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 310-12 (2nd Cir. 1986); see also Note, 7he
Libel-Proof PlaintiffDoctrine, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1909 (1985).
65. The panel stated that Masson, on tape, boasted of his sexual prowess, claiming to
have slept with more than 1,000 women before becoming an analyst. Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989).
66. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1566 (9th Cir. 1989)(Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting).
67. Id. In Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984), rev'd
[Vol. 71:901
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The Supreme Court majority rejected the incremental harm doc-
trine for reasons not unlike those outlined in the Ninth Circuit's dis-
senting opinion. Going one step further, the Court's majority made it
abundantly clear that the incremental harm doctrine is not embedded
in the First Amendment protection for speech.68 Dismissing sugges-
tions to the contrary, the Court reasoned that the question of incre-
mental harm has no bearing upon whether a defendant published the
subject statement with the requisite actual malice.
Though only two of the six contested quotations have thus far been
assessed in this Note, the Ninth Circuit offered no new wrinkles in
examining the other four passages. The question now ripe for the ask-
ing is this: would damage have been done had the Supreme Court sim-
ply put upon the appellate court's decision its stamp of approval? The
appellate panel gave writers a license to do that which any reputable
publication would frown upon.6 9 The panel would have allowed writ-
ers, when confronted with ambiguous utterances, to interpret what
the speaker said-then stuff it between quotation marks and pass it
off as a carbon copy of the actual statement. Never mind that the quo-
tation might wildly miss the mark. If the interpretation is rational, the
writer skirts libel litigation. Should that avenue lead to a dead end,
the reporter can escape by traveling the path of incremental harm.
That doctrine seemingly condones battering he who has already been
beaten. The Court's reversal did much for Masson and countless other
public figures. It did even more for a profession that would have been
on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), Justice Scalia said of the incremental harm
doctrine:
[Tihe theory must be rejected because it rests upon the assumption that
one's reputation is a monolith, which stands or falls in its entirety. The
law, however, proceeds upon the optimistic premise that there is a little
bit of good in all of us-or perhaps upon the pessimistic assumption that
no matter how bad someone is, he can always be worse. It is shameful
that Benedict Arnold was a traitor, but he was not a shoplifter to boot,
and one should not have been able to make that charge while knowing
its falsity with impunity.... Even the public outcast's remaining good
reputation, limited in scope though it may be, is not inconsequential.
68. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2436 (1991).
69. Consider the standard of quoting accuracy at the New York Times. The following
appeared in an internal bulletin issued from the Times news desk:
When is a quote not a quote? "That was a center of world terror that
doesn't exist anymore," we quoted Ariel Sharon as having said of south-
ern Lebanon (Feb. 26). But what he said--and what the reporter filed-
was less succinct: '"That was a center of world terror, that center of
world terror doesn't exist anymore." Scant difference in meaning, but a
larger difference ethically: Quotation marks guarantee the reader that
we're transmitting the subject's words, literally. If the speaker isn't
terse enough to suit us, we can tidy up the prose-but only after remov-
ing the quotation marks.
Tone of the Times, Winners & Sinners, N.Y. TmEms, Apr. 13, 1984, at 1, quoted in
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1562 (9th Cir. 1989)(Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting).
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embarrassed by a ruling exculpating writers so derelict in their dis-
seminative duties.
B. The Supreme Court Majority Opinion
The majority eschews the appellate court's application of the incre-
mental harm doctrine and the rational interpretation test. The Court,
instead, opts for a test that measures the materiality of the alterations
made within the quotation marks. The Court, noting that libel law
overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates on substantial truth,70
holds that deliberate alteration of a public figure's words is not action-
able unless the alterations materially change the meaning conveyed
by the statement. 71 The words can be bent; the meaning cannot be
broken. The Court proceeded to find the requisite material change in
five of the six quoted passages at issue.72 The Court found within the
general principles of defamation law sufficient elasticity to address
matters of misquotation. The idea of a special test tailored to inaccu-
rate quotations was explicitly rejected by the majority.7 3 The majority
rightly reversed the appellate panel, the members of which issued to a
generally responsible lot an unnecessary invitation to dabble in defam-
70. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (1991).
71. Id-
72. The Court concluded that the evidence presented a jury question as to whether
Malcolm acted with actual malice in the following five passages:
1. Masson was quoted as saying that he was like an "intellectual gigolo." On
tape, Masson said: "They felt, in a sense, I was a private asset but a public liabil-
ity ... They liked me when I was alone in their living room.. ." Id. at 2426.
2. Masson, speaking about Maresfield Gardens, was quoted as saying that "it
would also have been a place of sex, women, fun." On tape, Masson said "we were
to stay with each other and [laughs] we were going to pass women on to each
other, and we were going to have a great time together when I lived in the Freud
house." Id
3. Speaking of the anti-Freudian remarks made during the paper presentation
in 1981, Masson was quoted as saying "That remark about the sterility of psycho-
analysis was something I tacked on at the last minute, and it was totally gratui-
tous. I don't know why I put it in." On tape, he said: "I think the last sentence
was an in, [sic] possibly gratuitously offensive way to end a paper .... He also
said on tape that the remark "was true .. . I really believe it. I didn't believe
anybody would agree with me." Id at 2427.
4. Speaking of how analysts would react to his own book, Masson was quoted
as saying '"They will want me back, they will say that Masson is a great scholar, a
major analyst-after Freud, he's the greatest analyst who ever lived." On tape,
Masson said: "I hold a position that no other analyst holds, including, alas, Freud.
At first I thought: Okay, it's me and Freud against the rest of the analytic
world.... Not so, it's me. It's me alone." Id
5. The fifth passage is too lengthy to reproduce in full and cannot be explained
by extracting portions of the quote. In sum, it can be said that, as quoted, Masson
appears to assert that he was the "wrong man" to do "the honorable thing." On
tape, Masson described himself as a person willing to undergo a scandal in order
to shine the light of publicity upon the actions of the Freud Archives. Id at 2428.
73. Id at 2432.
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atory inaccuracies. Still, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion is notice-
ably sympathetic to the difficulties often encountered by journalists in
reconstructing quotations. Should the Court have demanded still
more of writers and reporters? That is, does there exist under a stan-
dard that takes note only of material alterations a possibility for
abuse?
The Court begins by giving to writers and those who edit their copy
the authority to make grammatical and syntactical corrections within
the quotation marks.74 With this, few can quarrel. Persons often
speak in long-winded clauses and parenthetical comments. As a re-
sult, they falter in their efforts to make their verbs agree with their
subjects. There is scant harm in changing "is" to "are" or "do" to
"does." Such minuscule cleanup work is excepted, partly because of
the recognition that it is more difficult to speak eloquently than to
write well. Writing is a methodical trade often plied in secluded and
comfortable confines. In contrast, speakers find themselves staring at
bright lights, encircled by notebook-toting reporters thirsty for con-
tentious commentary. To demean a speaker for an occasional gram-
matical gaffe is neither nice nor necessary. And to consider so minor a
make-over as libel fodder is unthinkable.
Beyond grammatical and syntactical changes, the Court also ex-
cuses alterations that do not materially change the meaning of the ac-
tual statement.7 5 The question of what constitutes a material change
in meaning becomes the fighting issue. Reviewing the six passages to
which the Court applied its "material change" standard is of limited
help. The five alterations that the Court deemed material begged for
such a conclusion. A review of the standard as applied to those five
passages only alerts writers that a gross twisting of another's words is
impermissible.
There may be more value in examining the alterations that the
Court found to be immaterial. As has been previously stated, Masson
said on tape that he changed his middle name to Moussaieff because
he "just liked it."76 Malcolm quoted him as saying that he made the
change because "it sounded better."77 It is hard to imagine how such
an alteration could cripple one's character. The Court obviously felt
that when words are reshaped in so harmless a way, the public figure
should be left remediless. But had the "it sounded better" passage
been the only misquotation in the 48,500-word piece, one wonders
whether Masson would have instigated a libel suit. And if he had filed
suit on the basis of that statement, would a jury have awarded any
74. Id. at 2431-32.
75. Id. at 2433.
76. Id at 2426.
77. Id-
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meaningful amount of money?7 8
Suppose the Court would have adopted a standard permitting a
plaintiff, on the issue of actual malice, to defeat a summary judgment
motion if able to show that the alterations were not merely grammati-
cal or syntactical.79 Public figures whose words were not materially
altered would not be standing in line at the courthouse to file suit.
And those who would file suit over innocuous alterations would be
unlikely to recover appreciable damage awards. Thus, the Court let
pass an opportunity to impose a high standard of reportorial accuracy
without setting off a libel avalanche. Instead, the Court articulated a
standard that is too fair to those who write about public figures. The
forgiving standard leaves room for abuse and gives members of the
audience reason to adopt an attitude of agnosticism toward the words
they read.
A writer or reporter could stray substantially from the speaker's
actual words8 0 before running afoul with the Court's material change
standard. Marginal creativity and a mediocre vocabulary will allow
one to say the same thing in a never-ending number of ways. Consider
this fictitious scenario: A reporter wandering through the Statehouse
happens upon the Republican governor, who agrees to a quick inter-
view about the ongoing budget battle. The governor, never one to pack
a punch with his words, says in response to a question: "There are
some Democrats in our Legislature who would like to spend a lot of
money, even though the amount of money that the state has right now
is not that much." The reporter--elated to have an exclusive inter-
view, but irked with his subject's beige babbling-quotes the governor
as saying: "Those on the left side of the aisle have champagne appe-
tites, but this state has a beer pocketbook." Would a good reporter
inject life into so insipid an utterance? Probably not. Is there room
78. The assumption in this Note is that Masson would, in the hypothetical case, re-
ceive little or nothing. However, exorbitant libel awards are in no way uncom-
mon. In 1984, the Libel Defense Resource Council reported that jury awards in
libel cases had risen faster than awards in any other category. See RALPH L. HoL-
SINGER, MEDIA LAw 118 (1st ed. 1987). Further libel statistics indicate that plain-
tiffs who can get past summary judgment have a success rate with juries in the
range of 80 percent. MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON MASS MEDIA LAw 406 (4th ed. 1990). But defendants appeal virtu-
ally all jury losses and obtain reversals in about 70 percent of the cases. Id.
79. This is precisely the standard that Masson urged the Court to adopt. Masson v.
New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (1991).
80. The Court's discussion is confined to words spoken. But what of the reporter who
quotes from that which is written? The Court does not say whether the same
"material change" standard would apply. Major metropolitan newspapers ran
stories on the Masson case one day after the decision came down. Most of those
stories quoted portions of Justice Kennedy's majority opinion. But were those
Kennedy's exact words, or was the justice misquoted? Couldn't reporters have
taken the forgiving "material change" standard for a test drive one day after the
Court put it on the lot?
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for such tinkering under the Court's holding? Probably so.8 1 The
meaning of the governor's actual statement is left intact. The gover-
nor, in both the actual utterance and the altered quotation, is simply
asserting that Democrats are attempting to spend beyond the state's
means.
That a reporter would be tempted to make less vapid his sources'
spoken words should surprise no one. A newsmaker can give to a re-
porter no greater gift than an animated utterance. During a four-hour
committee hearing on taxation legislation, there undoubtedly will be a
dearth of quotable quips. The lawmaker who pipes up with a snappy
quote attains instant hero status among the press corps. Certain poli-
ticians, coaches and celebrities are quoted more often than are others.
It's not that these oft-quoted types are more important than their col-
leagues. Rather, they are the poets, able to weave words artistically.
Reporters soon develop an ear for the perfect quote. The minute a
smidgen of eloquence spills from a speaker's mouth at a press confer-
ence, members of the reporting legion put pens to paper and the writ-
ing race is on.
Under Masson, ears that deftly detect good quotes are unnecessary.
So long as the reporter pays attention to the meaning conveyed by the
speaker, his creativity will supply the vivacious quotes. Will it ever
happen? Readers may never know. A person not blessed with orator-
ical talents is unlikely to cry foul when made to look sharper than she
is.
But suppose the altered quotation makes the speaker appear more
lifeless and inarticulate than is actually the case. Simply flip-flop the
aforediscussed scenario. If the governor actually made the "cham-
pagne appetite" comment, might a reporter bereft of conscience doctor
the quote to the governor's detriment? That is, might the reporter
wrap quotation marks around the comparatively dull language?
When good quotes knock, reporters generally answer. But reporters
and newsmakers are not always the best of friends. Adversarial rela-
tionships are common, if not necessary. The Court's standard seem-
ingly would allow a reporter to turn a well-spoken wordsmith into a
blunderbuss.82 The only catch-a small one--is that the meaning of
81. Concededly, the reporter's alteration in the fictitious scenario would not be inju-
rious to the governor's reputation-unless the governor was known by the electo-
rate to be an ardent teetotaler who never would allow intoxicants to spill over
into his vocabulary. This Note does not endorse making non-defamatory altera-
tions actionable. Rather, the scenario above has been included in this Note pri-
marily to decry the way in which the Masson standard allows one to intentionally
alter quotations without offending the actual malice standard.
82. A plaintiff made to look worse (as in this scenario) is more likely to recover than
the plaintiff who-due to the reporter's desire to inject life into the quotation-is
made to look better. That's because the published statement, to be actionable,
must also be defamatory. Persons made to appear foolish due to an altered quota-
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the statement must be substantially preserved. Whether a speaker is
made to look better or worse, the practice of deliberately altering quo-
tations in a defamatory fashion deserves condemnation in the court-
room and newsroom alike.
The Court, through its Masson decision, has given to writers and
reporters what many will view as a break.83 But the gift will reap
little good. To newspapers and magazines, credibility is critical. In-
deed, it is all they have. Many newspapers today have been diagnosed
with a life-threatening ailment: declining readership. People pressed
for time are resorting to the electronic media. But print media boost-
ers don't decline invitations to extol the virtues of their product. They
claim that there is in a newspaper depth and detail not available on
the telly or over the airwaves. They also preach proudly of what they
say is a painstaking commitment to unequaled accuracy. To be accu-
rate is to be credible. And court rulings that relax accuracy standards
chip away at the credibility that the print media can ill afford to lose.
C. The Supreme Court Dissenting Opinion
The dissent proposes saddling writers and reporters with the most
stringent of standards. Under the approach embraced by Justices
White and Scalia, the actual malice requirement would be satisfied
upon a showing that a quotation had been deliberately altered.84 At
first blush, the dissent's stance appears unduly unforgiving. In the
end, it isn't. White proceeds logically, arriving at a virtually ines-
capable conclusion.
The dissent begins by reiterating that actual malice means publica-
tion with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or fal-
sity.85 White then allies himself with the majority in stating that
quotation marks indicate that the source spoke the words as quoted.86
His conclusion is simple: if Malcolm asserted that Masson spoke those
very words, knowing that he did not, she published a "knowing false-
hood."87 White is on target in asserting that Times v. Sullivan forbade
reporting a known falsehood. Commenting on the Masson majority,
White wrote that "[t]he falsehood, apparently, must be substantial; the
tion are far more likely to be defamed than are persons who are made to appear
sharper or more clever.
83. The Masson decision was greeted with "widespread relief by lawyers represent-
ing the press." Linda Greenhouse, The Justices Refuse to Open a Gate for Libel
Cases N.Y. TImEs, June 21, 1991, at 1, col. 5.
84. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2437-38 (1991)(White, J.,
dissenting).
85. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
86. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (1991)(White, J.,
dissenting).
87. Id at 2437-38.
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reporter may lie a little, but not too much."88 The implication is that,
on matters of misquotation, the rule of Times v. Sullivan is ignored, or
at least loosened to the benefit of the press.
It would be unfair to simply laud the arrows of criticism that White
aims in the majority's direction. The position actually advocated by
the dissent deserves assessment. It is apparent that the dissent carves
no exception for writers and editors who make grammatical or syntac-
tical changes to quotations. Not even Masson urged adoption of so
strict a standard. Rather, he maintained that changes beyond grammar
and syntax should be taken to constitute actual malice.89 An excep-
tion for grammatical and syntactical changes has been endorsed previ-
ously in this Note.9 0
The dissent, by issuing a reminder that statements are actionable
only if defamatory, does well to quell fears that so unforgiving a stan-
dard would spawn a deluge of libel litigation. White makes a critical
point in noting that a plaintiff would not automatically advance to
trial even if the actual malice issue is determined to be one for the
jury. Motions for summary judgment can be made on grounds other
than want of actual malice.91 For instance, it could be decided as a
matter of law that no reasonable jury could find that the public figure
was subjected to hatred, ridicule or contempt.92 With the fear of frivo-
lous suits effectively defused by White,93 the dissent's stance, however
stringent, seems appropriate.
The dissenting opinion does more than put its support behind a
strict standard. It tells writers how they could avoid running afoul
with the standard, if indeed it were in place. White contends that a
reporter unable to reproduce the words precisely as they were spoken
should simply paraphrase.94 White is right. But so elementary a solu-
tion is not easily seconded, if for no other reason than White's appar-
ent failure to recognize the value of the direct quotation. The Ninth
Circuit's dissenting opinion recognizes that direct quotations lend
credibility to an article.9 5 Only through direct quotes can readers
draw their own conclusions and get a true feel for the speaker. And in
pieces such as the one penned by Malcolm, direct quotes are more a
necessity than a narrative luxury. But quotations do more than en-
88. Id- at 2438.
89. Id- at 2431.
90. See discussion of the majority opinion, supra.
91. Id. at 2438.
92. IAL, referring to CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. sec. 45 (West 1982).
93. White offered this example: if Malcolm would have written that Masson said he
wore contact lenses, when in fact he said nothing of his eyes or vision, the judge
would grant summary judgment to the defendants and dismiss the case. Id.
94. Id.
95. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1549 (9th Cir. 1989)(Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting).
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hance credibility and pad profiles. Objective reporting requires news
copy to be surrounded with a stylistic straitjacket. The news is a bland
course, served to the reader with little or no seasoning. But once in a
while-about every three or four column inches-the reader is fed a
direct quotation. The quote is an oasis of sorts, offering relief from the
sterility that so permeates newswriting.
As White suggests, reporters should not use direct quotations when
unable to resurrect the speaker's words with precision.96 But neither
should reporters accept paraphrasing as a suitable alternative. Had
four other justices endorsed White's view, reporters simply would
have had to try harder when attempting to resurrect exact utterances.
Reporters anxious to obviate the risk of misquotation can run tape
recorders if not up against tight deadlines. Reporters can also read
quotes back to the source. Should the source attempt to alter the
words originally spoken, the reporter can quote the second version or
paraphrase the first. Finally, writers can "capture the gist" of a state-
ment by using "intermittent quotation marks," as illustrated in this
sentence.
The dissent's apparent inability to appreciate the problems that
plague reporters is somewhat disturbing. But the standard it advo-
cates is not. Ideally, the dissent would have excepted grammatical and
syntactical alterations. But the dissent's endorsement of a standard
that fosters a strong commitment to accuracy more than offsets its
failure to carve out the aforementioned exception. If White would
have had his way, direct quotations would have been just that. There
would have been no cloudburst of libel litigation. And by refusing to
excuse deliberate alterations, the dissent would have meritoriously
maintained the readership's trust in the words within the quotation
marks.
V. CONCLUSION
Quoting a newsmaker can be as simple as pressing the "record"
button on the tape recorder. Writers and reporters who adore the
quote but abhor the recorder must scribble furiously. Trying to catch
a speaker's every word with mere pen and paper is not an activity for
those destitute of dexterity. But the note-taking reporter who misses
an occasional word need not hail a libel lawyer. Negligently misquot-
ing a source is excusable error 97 under the standard set forth in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.98 Thus, the Masson Court unnecessarily
and paternalistically rushes to the aid of a profession already equipped
96. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2438 (1991)(White, J.,
dissenting).
97. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989).
98. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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with an adequate arsenal. In Masson, the Court builds on the forgive-
ness already extended to those who misquote negligently and misap-
propriates protection to those who misquote deliberately. The
erroneous implication is that intentional distortion is a vital organ that
prolongs life among newspapers and magazines.
In medical parlance, the question in Masson was whether quota-
tions could be doctored. The Ninth Circuit would have given to writ-
ers and editors an ax to perform major reconstructive surgery on
quotations. The Court refused to tolerate such gross disfigurement,
but still allowed writers to perform substantial operations on others'
words. The best standard, urged by Masson himself, went unadopted.
The petitioner would have placed in the palms of writers and editors a
scalpel to surgically remove grammatical blunders. The dissent came
closest to the standard urged by Masson, recognizing that one's words
are no less inviolate than his person. Had more members of the Court
recognized as much, a noble and credibility-enhancing benediction
would have been given to a standard encouraging the utmost in
accuracy.
Steven M. Thomas, '93
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